Unsichere Airlines, Schwarze Liste der Fluggesellschaften

Zusammenfassung:
Es erschallten verschiedene Alarmsignale, welche weder der Kapitän noch der Co-Pilot eindeutig zuordnen konnten.

Der Alarm zeigte an, dass nicht genügend Sauerstoff in der Kabine (und somit auch im Cockpit) vorhanden war. Hintergrund: kaputte Klimaanlage.

Ungenügende Sauerstoffversorgung in großen Höhen bedeutet, dass Menschen in eine Art Rauschzustand geraten. Sie benehmen sich wie Betrunkene. Dieser Zustand tritt schleichend ein, subjektiv kaum wahrnehmbar. Deshalb ist es so enorm wichtig, sofort zu den Sauerstoffmasken zu greifen, wenn in großen Höhen der Druck abfällt.

Kapitän und Copilot waren offenbar von verschiedenen Warnsignalen im Cockpit überfordert, wussten nicht genau, was los war. In der Zwischenzeit fielen sie wegen Sauerstoffmangels in eine Art Trancezustand.


Doch die Crew begriff das wohl nicht so richtig und geriet subjektiv schnell in den Rauschzustand und wurde anschließend ohnmächtig.

Währenddessen führte der Autopilot das Flugzeug in immer größere Höhen und verschlimmerte damit die Sauerstoffknappheit. Die Crew wurde unterdessen vollkommen ausgeschaltet, ohnmächtig.

Angeblich hat noch ein flugerfahrener Steward versucht, das Flugzeug zu landen. Doch dieser war wegen Sauerstoffmangels ebenfalls bald ausgeschaltet.

Sauerstoffmangel in großen Höhen führt erst zu einer Art Euphorie und dann zu einer vollkommenen Unzurechnungsfähigkeit. Menschen sind noch nicht mal in der Lage, 1+1 zusammen zu zählen.

Unterdessen steuerte der Autopilot die Maschine so lange auf Kurs, bis der Sprit aus war. Folge: Absturz.

Urteil: Erfahrene Piloten hätte frühzeitig die richtige Diagnose gestellt und wären in nierdige Höhen ausgewichen. Sie hätten außerdem die Warnsignale im Cockpit richtig gedeutet. Es gab wohl im Fall von Helios zusätzlich enorme Sprachprobleme zwischen dem deutschen Kapitän und dem zypriotischen Co - Piloten. Alles zusamme führte in die Katastrophe.



Hier die Untersuchungsergebnisse in englisch:

On August 14, 2005, Helios Airways flight HCY 522 headed from Larnaca, Cyprus to Athens International Airport crashed north of Athens, resulting in the loss of all passengers and crew. Reports said the pilots were unconscious when the plane went down, possibly because of a lack of oxygen in the cabin due to decompression.
The Boeing Corporation 737, with 115 passengers and six crew members aboard, was due to fly onto Prague, Czech Republic after stopping in Athens. Two F-16 fighter jets were scrambled shortly after the plane entered Greek air space over the Aegean Sea and did not respond to radio calls.
Greek radio and television stations reported that the air force pilots saw no movement in the cockpit of the plane before the crash.
στα ελληνικά

Accident Investigation Summary (As of 7 September 2005)
The investigation of the crash of the Helios Airways Flight 522 has confirmed that the pressurization system on the plane was not activated because the pressurization valve and an air outflow valve were set incorrectly. Thus, the airliner cabin failed to pressurize on take-off. The investigation has further reportedly shown a basis for asserting claims not only against Helios Airways but also Boeing Corporation, the manufacturer of the plane. Crew members were apparently confused as to the meaning of a warning horn and failed to recognize that the cabin was not pressurizing until they grew mentally disoriented because of lack of oxygen and lost consciousness.
The Helios plane, a Boeing 737-300, underwent maintenance the night before the accident. The maintenance crew report left a pressurization controller rotary knob out of place, which meant that the plane could not pressurize properly. At 10,000 feet, an alarm went off to warn the crew that the plane would not pressurize. Crew members mistakenly thought that the alarm horn was a warning to tell them that their controls were not set properly for takeoff.
In the Boeing 737, the same horn is used for both failure of pressurization and failure to set controls properly for takeoff, although it will sound for takeoff configuration only while the plane is still on the ground.
The plane continued to climb on autopilot. At 14,000 feet, oxygen masks deployed as designed, and a master caution light illuminated in the cockpit. Another alarm sounded at about the same time on an unrelated matter, warning that there was insufficient cooling air in the compartment housing avionics equipment.
As the plane continued to climb on autopilot, the air grew so thin that the crew became seriously impaired. The captain lost consciousness first on the floor of the cockpit, followed by the co-pilot, who remained in his seat, according to the officials. The autopilot took the plane to 34,000 feet to Athens, entered a holding pattern, until fuel ran low and one engine quit.
Boeing, the maker of the plane, issued a notice shortly after the crash to airlines that it would revise flight crew training manuals to emphasize to crews that they must understand how the various warning systems work and what to do about them. "Confusion between the cabin altitude warning horn and the takeoff configuration warning horn can be resolved if the crew remembers that the takeoff configuration warning horn is only armed when the airplane is on the ground," the notice said. "If this horn is activated in flight, it indicates that the cabin altitude has reached 10,000 feet."